An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game by Cadigan, John J. et al.
Economics Faculty Publications Economics
10-2009
An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in
a Multilateral Bargaining Game
John J. Cadigan
Gettysburg College
Pamela Schmitt
U.S. Naval Academy
Robert Shupp
Michigan State University
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/econfac
Part of the Economics Commons
Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.
This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of
the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/econfac/10
This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an
authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact cupola@gettysburg.edu.
Cadigan, John J., Pamela Schmitt, Robert Shupp and Kurtis Swope. "An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral
Bargaining Game." Southern Economic Journal 76.2 (October 2009), 444-457.
An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral
Bargaining Game
Abstract
When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an
individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the
exchange. This "holdout problem" is a common feature of the land-assembly literature because development
frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine
holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi-person groups, complementary
exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number
of bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on
average, a payoff-improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive
initial bargaining stance in multi-period bargaining treatments relative to single-period treatments, but take a
less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi-
period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single-period treatments, both with and
without delay costs. [excerpt]
Keywords
Bargain, Holdout, Economic Exchange
Disciplines
Economics
Authors
John J. Cadigan, Pamela Schmitt, Robert Shupp, and Kurtis Swope
This article is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/econfac/10
Southern Economic Journal 2009. 76(2). 444^57 
An Experimental Study of the Holdout 
Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game 
John Cadigan,* Pamela Schmitt,f Robert Shupp,J and Kurtis Swope? 
When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential 
exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share 
of the surplus created by the exchange. This "holdout problem" is a common feature of the 
land-assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple 
parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory 
bargaining game that involves multi-person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout 
externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of 
bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions 
and is, on average, a payoff-improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders 
take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi-period bargaining treatments relative 
to single-period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. 
Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall 
efficiency relative to the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs. 
JEL Classification: C9, C7, Kl, J5 
1. Introduction 
When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the 
potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a 
greater share of the total surplus created by the exchange. This "holdout problem," as it has 
been called, is a common feature of the land-assembly literature (Coase 1960; Eckart 1985; 
O'Flaherty 1994; Strange 1995; Menezes and Pitchford 2004a, b; Miceli and Segerson 2007; 
Miceli and Sirmans 2007; Nosal 2007) because land development and urban renewal frequently 
require the assembly of multiple parcels of land. Similarly, the production of new products may 
require the use of multiple intermediate patented goods. Strategic delay and holdout have also 
been studied in other contexts, including debt restructuring that requires acceptance of an 
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exchange offer by multiple creditors (Brown 1989; Datta and Iskandar-Datta 1995; Hege 2003; 
Miller and Thomas 2006) and wage negotiations (Cramton and Tracy 1992; Gu and Kuhn 
1998; van Ours 1999; Houba and Bolt 2000). In each case, it may be difficult or impossible to 
distinguish strategic holdout behavior from more genuine disagreement arising because a 
buyer's offer is below a seller's reservation price. 
Because of the potentially large inefficiencies arising from failed exchanges in land 
assembly, the holdout problem has been cited as one justification for eminent domain, the legal 
power of the state to expropriate private property without the owner's consent.1 Eminent 
domain has traditionally been used in the United States to acquire land for public projects but 
has been increasingly used to facilitate, with considerable controversy, the transfer of property 
from one private owner to another.2 In most cases, eminent domain is accompanied by a 
requirement that just compensation be paid, generally interpreted to be fair market value.3 
From an economic perspective, whether the application of eminent domain can be viewed 
as efficient depends on the relative values attached to the parcels by the parties involved in the 
exchange and the costs associated with delay. Difficulties associated with estimating these 
parameters using field data complicate the identification and measurement of holdout 
behavior, and for this reason previous research on the land-assembly problem has been 
primarily theoretical.4 This article uses experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in 
laboratory bargaining games that involve multi-person groups, complementary exchanges, and 
holdout externalities. While there is a large literature on laboratory bargaining behavior, the 
vast majority of these studies examine behavior in two-person games involving a single "buyer" 
(or proposer) and a single "seller" (or responder). While one party may "holdout" in multi 
period bargaining environments (see, for example, McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; Gneezy, 
Haruvy, and Roth 2003) in hopes of receiving a larger payoff, there are no co-dependent 
transactions. Thus, while there may be costly delay in simple two-person bargaining 
environments, no holdout externalities of the kind commonly associated with land-assembly 
type problems are present. Some experimental analyses of Coasian bargaining (for example, 
Hoffman and Spitzer 1986; Harrison et al. 1987) include larger groups but lack the critical 
interdependence of transactions necessary for holdout externalities. This research, therefore, 
provides an important link between the theoretical analysis of holdout developed extensively in 
the land-assembly literature and the experimental analysis of behavior in bargaining games. 
We distinguish the holdout problem from a related "hold-up" problem (Williamson 1975; 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004; Dawid and MacLeod 
2008), which refers to the case when an upstream agent must make a costly investment in the 
first stage of a game that is only of use to a single downstream agent in the second stage. In such 
cases, a first-period investment can be held up in a second period by the downstream agent in 
an attempt to extract a greater share of the total surplus generated by the investment. The ex 
post commitment problem inherent in the hold-up problem can lead to inefficiently low 
investment in the first stage of the game. 
If a land assembler must purchase a set of required parcels sequentially, then initial 
purchases may represent an investment that is not easily reversible, or reversible only at a 
1 Eminent domain is also called "compulsory purchase," "compulsory acquisition," or "expropriation." 2 See Kelo v. City of New London (2005) for a recent example. 
3 See Munch (1975); Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984); Hermalin (1995); and Nosal (2001, 2007) for more on 
eminent domain and compensation. 4 The one exception is Tanaka (2007). 
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considerable loss to the assembler. In such cases, both a hold-up and a holdout problem exist in 
the bargaining game as landowners who have not yet sold may ex post exploit the assembler's 
previous investment. However, if the assembler can write contingent contracts, such that no 
purchases occur unless agreement is reached with all landowners, then only a holdout problem 
exists. We model only the latter situation. 
We examine the holdout problem with six experimental treatments that vary the bargaining 
institution, the number of bargaining periods, and the cost associated with delay. Our results 
demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff-improving 
strategy for responders, despite theoretical predictions. Initial offers-to-buy decrease and 
demands-to-sell increase in multi-period bargaining treatments relative to a single-period 
treatment. Responders are also more likely to reject a given offer in multi-period treatments. 
Imposing delay costs causes offers-to-buy to rise, demands-to-sell to fall, a higher probability of 
responders to accept a given offer or demand, and less overall holdout. Importantly, nearly all 
exchanges eventually occur in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency 
relative to the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs. 
However, caution should be exercised when considering the implications of our results for 
the eminent domain question. Our treatments have a very small number of sellers and complete 
and perfect information, characteristics that are unlikely to be present in the field. Therefore, 
the current study should be viewed as an initial empirical investigation of holdout behavior and 
costs, leaving many important questions unanswered. The potential for eminent domain to 
improve social welfare in the field depends upon the costs of delay relative to the costs of 
potentially inefficient land transfers and the disincentive effects of weakened property rights 
when eminent domain is used; the prospect of eminent domain may also increase bargaining 
delay if buyers expect to pay less under eminent domain transfer compared to the free-market 
transfer of property. For example, Munch (1975) demonstrates that the prospect of eminent 
domain tends to reduce some property values, leading to eminent domain prices below market 
value. These issues can only be resolved through further study. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic 
model that motivates the experimental design. Section 3 presents the experimental treatments 
and provides equilibrium predictions. Experimental results are given in section 4, followed by 
concluding remarks in section 5. 
2. Modeling Framework 
Following Menezes and Pitchford (2004b) and Miceli and Segerson (2007), consider a simple 
model in which a single risk-neutral agent (the buyer) wishes to purchase N complementary units 
of a good from Another independent risk-neutral agents (the sellers). The units can be interpreted 
as intermediate inputs into the production of a large project. Each seller / has one unit for sale and 
incurs a cost c,- for this unit. The value of the project to the buyer is V if N input units can be 
acquired but is zero otherwise. Let the buyer's valuation and the sellers' costs be such that 
f><K, (1) /= 1 
indicating that there is an economic surplus generated by the project. 
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Assuming N input units can be acquired, the payoff to the buyer is 
F_X>)' 
(2) 
where pf is the price paid for unit /, and each seller / receives a payoff (pt 
- 
ct). Assume the 
buyer may write contingent contracts such that no sales occur (and, therefore, all parties receive 
a payoff of zero) if any of the required input units are not purchased. 
We suppose that bargaining takes place between the buyer and the sellers over several 
periods. Delay is costly, such that payoffs are reduced by a factor 5 (where 0 < 5 < 1) for each 
additional period, on average, needed for agreements to be reached. For example, payoffs 
would be reduced by 5 if all agreements were reached in the second period, reduced by 25 if 
agreements were reached in the third period, and so on. This is equivalent to assuming that the 
economic surplus {V 
? 
J^=lCi) shrinks by 5 from period to period. 
We recognize that our approach to delay costs is one of many that could be chosen. Our 
intent here is to model a symmetric holdout externality. Therefore, a rejection by a responder of 
any offer or demand imposes a cost on other bargaining parties regardless of the choices of 
other responders. This is consistent both with the nature of contingent contracts and the real 
possibility that bargaining involves transaction costs that are incurred each time an offer or a 
demand is made. An alternative assumption would be to model delay costs as a weakest link. 
That is, all payoffs are reduced by (t 
- 
1)5, where t is the actual round in which the last needed 
offer is accepted. While qualitatively similar to our design, this design would not impose a 
holdout externality by the first responders to accept an offer or a demand. The externality 
would be driven entirely by the last responder to accept an offer or a demand. This is an 
interesting alternative and would be consistent with the idea of holdout as referring to an 
individual bargaining party; whereas, our design models holdout as a strategy that can be 
adopted by any or all responders at once. 
3. The Experiment 
We use one-sided, ultimatum-type bargaining rather than more complex multi-party Nash 
bargaining5 or bargaining with alternating offers. Nash bargaining does not allow one party to 
hold out by explicitly rejecting an offer, which is of primary interest in the current project. It 
would also place greater importance on risk preferences and is difficult to implement 
experimentally because of the likelihood of off-equilibrium decisions. We also avoid bargaining 
with alternating offers because it introduces an additional incentive to reject an offer in order to 
become the proposer. To examine the importance of being the proposer, we compare separate 
treatments in which buyers make repeated take-it-or-leave-it offers to buy in some treatments 
and sellers make repeated take-it-or-leave-it demands to sell in other treatments. Responders 
decide only whether to accept or reject an offer or a demand. 
5 Under Nash bargaining, all parties submit a demand for their share of the surplus. If the sum of the demands is less 
than or equal to the surplus, each party is paid its demand. If the sum of the demands exceeds the surplus, all parties 
receive zero. 
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Experimentell Treatments 
All treatments are conducted with one buyer and two sellers, using z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher 2007). We conducted six treatments in a 3 x 2 design. Two treatments are single 
period bargaining games and four treatments are (up to) 10-period bargaining games. Two of 
the latter treatments have costless delay (that is, ? 
= 0%) and two treatments have costly delay. 
In these costly delay treatments, 8 
= 10%. That is, all payoffs are reduced by 10% for each 
additional period, on average, needed for agreements to be reached. For example, if one buyer 
is making repeated offers to two sellers, all participants' payoffs are reduced by 5% each time a 
seller rejects an offer. If both sellers accept in the first period, payoffs are not reduced. If both 
accept in the second period, all payoffs are reduced by 10%. If one seller accepts in the first 
period and the other in the third period, payoffs are reduced by 10%, and so on. Thus, holding 
out generates a payoff-reducing externality regardless of the decisions of the other subjects. 
The six total treatments are generated by conducting the (i) single-period, (ii) multi-period 
with costless delay, and (iii) multi-period with costly delay protocol (our Baseline protocol), with 
buyers making offers in the first three treatments and sellers making demands in the other three 
treatments. In each case, the party receiving the offer or demand chooses to accept or reject. If any 
party rejects an offer or a demand in the single-period treatments (or fails to accept an offer or a 
demand by period 10 in the multi-period treatments), then all bargaining parties in that group 
receive a payoff of zero. For the multi-period treatments, if a responder rejects an offer or a 
demand, the proposer is able to make a new offer or demand for up to a maximum of 10 periods. 
Unlike in the Gneezy, Haruvy, and Roth (2003) experiments, proposers in our experiment are not 
constrained to increase their offers (or reduce their demands) upon a rejection. 
Valuations and costs are common knowledge. The buyer's valuation is V 
= $90. The 
sellers' costs are symmetric such that c\ 
= c2 = $30. This results in an economic surplus of $30 
that may be divided among the three participants. All offers/demands (within a period) are 
made simultaneously. Once a seller accepts an offer from the buyer, or has a demand accepted 
by the buyer, that seller makes no additional decisions. Sellers do not observe offers or 
demands made for other sellers' units but are informed of the amount of any accepted offer or 
demand. Subjects are informed of their experimental earnings (adjusted for any delay costs) 
plus a $10 show-up fee and are paid privately, in cash, at the end of the experiment. 
Equilibrium Predictions 
Assuming complete information and that each agent seeks to maximize his monetary self 
interest, the well-known unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the single-period 
ultimatum game is for the proposer to offer the smallest share of the surplus possible and for 
the responder to accept it. Let bt represent a buyer's offer to buy, and dt represent a seller's 
demand to sell a particular unit. In the multi-seller design used here, this implies the following: 
Proposition 1. When the buyer makes ultimatum offers, she offers each seller her cost. 
That is, bi 
= 
cf V/.6 
6 
Technically, each seller is indifferent between accepting or rejecting. Therefore, accepting is a weakly dominant strategy 
and, therefore, constitutes a best response. One could alternatively assume that /?, 
= c, + 8, where e is the smallest unit 
of account available (one cent in our experiment). In this case, each seller earns a small surplus by accepting. For 
simplicity, we assume that e -> 0 in the limit and proceed without the more cumbersome notation. 
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Proposition 2. When sellers make ultimatum demands, multiple equilibria exist. The set of 
equilibria are characterized by H1^ldj= V and dt 
> ct V7. 
Proposition 3. Responders should accept any offer or set of demands that leaves them 
with a non-negative surplus. 
Proposition 1 is the standard equilibrium prediction for proposer behavior, which implies 
here that the buyer captures all (or nearly all) of the surplus. Proposition 2 characterizes a 
Nash-like bargaining outcome from the perspective of sellers. Proposition 3 follows from the 
assumption that a positive payoff is preferred to a zero payoff. 
Propositions 1 through 3 are unaffected by the addition of multiple bargaining periods, 
with or without costly delay. Responders cannot increase their payoff by rejecting an offer or 
a set of demands that leaves them with a non-negative surplus because there is nothing in 
the standard game-theoretic predictions of proposers' behavior to indicate that they, 
in equilibrium, should offer a greater share of the surplus following a rejected offer or 
demand. 
The wealth of research in single-period, ultimatum-type bargaining games has consistently 
demonstrated that behavior does not conform to the standard predictions based on the simple 
assumption of maximizing one's monetary self-interest. However, this research provides little 
guidance on what we should expect in a multi-period bargaining game of the type presented 
here. In the multi-period treatments, responders may hold out in the hope of obtaining a larger 
share of the surplus. This possibility raises some interesting behavioral questions: Do either 
initial or subsequent offers or demands in a multiple-period game differ from those in a single 
period game? Are responders more likely to reject a given offer or demand in a multi-period 
game compared to the single-period game? How do proposers in a multi-period game respond 
to a rejection? Is holding out a payoff-improving strategy, on average? How is the duration of 
holdout affected by the cost of delay? Do the rate of disagreement (that is, failed exchanges) 
and the efficiency of exchange differ in the multi-period game compared to the single-period 
game? 
Table 1. Offer/Demand and Earnings Results by Treatment (Standard Deviations in 
Parentheses) 
Proposer Treatment 
Mean Mean Buyer Mean Seller Mean Real 
First-Period First-Period First-Period Final Buyer 
Offer/Demand Earnings Earnings Earnings 
Mean Real 
Final Seller Number 
Earnings of Groups 
Buyer 
Buyer 
Buyer 
Seller 
Seller 
Seller 
Single period 
10-period 
costless delay 
10-period costly 
delay 
Single period 
10-period 
costless delay 
10-period costly 
delay 
$36.62 
(3.45) 
$34.28 
(3.31) 
$35.82 
(2.57) 
$41.66 
(4.71) 
$46.73 
(7.62) 
$44.17 
(6.86) 
$16.76 
(6.66) 
$21.43 
(6.26) 
$18.37 
(5.08) 
$6.68 
(6.94) 
-$3.46 
(11.06) 
$1.65 
(8.94) 
$6.62 
(3.45) 
$4.28 
(3.31) 
$5.82 
(2.57) 
$11.66 
(4.71) 
$16.73 
(7.61) 
$14.17 
(6.86) 
$8.62 
(8.60) 
$10.55 
(5.25) 
$11.12 
(5.67) 
$6.94 
(6.05) 
$10.43 
(5.02) 
$9.39 
(4.90) 
$4.48 
(4.45) 
$9.72 
(3.00) 
$7.24 
(2.78) 
$8.07 
(5.67) 
$9.28 
(3.38) 
$7.80 N = 30 
(2.96) 
N = 29 
N = 29 
N = 30 
N = 26 
TV = 30 
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Table 2. Probit Regression Results for Responders' Decisions (marginal effects, dFIdx, for the 
probability of acceptance are reported) 
Buyer-Offer Treatments Seller-Demand Treatments 
Offer/Demand 0.055*** -0.063*** 
Single Period 0.370*** 0.580*** 
Costless Delay -0.381** -0.244*** 
TV 176 172 
Pseudo R2 0.388 0.583 
Prob > x2 0.000 0.000 
** 
Significant at the 5% level. 
*** 
Significant at the 1% level. 
4. Results 
Subjects for all treatments were undergraduate volunteers at Gettysburg College. Subjects 
participated anonymously via computer. Five hundred and twenty-two student subjects 
participated in 30 sessions for a total of about 30 bargaining groups per treatment. 
Table 1 presents offer, demand, and earnings results from the six treatments. The table 
gives the mean first-period offer or demand, as well as the mean real final payoff for buyers and 
sellers. Real payoffs are adjusted for any delay costs. For comparison, the table also gives the 
mean buyer and seller earnings that would have resulted had all first-period offers or demands 
been accepted. 
Table 2 reports the marginal effects from a probit regression analysis of responders' first 
period decisions. The response variable is defined such that accept 
= 1, reject 
= 0. We analyze 
the buyer-offer and seller-demand protocols separately, controlling in each case for the offer or 
demand and including two dummy variables indicating that the treatment was single period or 
had costless delay. The default {Baseline) is the multi-period costly delay treatment. 
Table 3 provides rejection, holdout, and efficiency statistics. Holdout is calculated as the 
mean number of rejected offers or demands per group. Efficiency is calculated as the actual 
total group earnings divided by the maximum possible ($30 per group, the value of the original 
surplus). 
A large number of comparisons can be made based on the results in Tables 1, 2, and 3. To 
keep these comparisons most clear, we discuss each in a separate subsection below. 
Table 3. Holdout and Efficiency Results 
Proposer Treatment 
Percentage of 
First-Period 
Rejections 
Mean Holdout 
(Total Rejections 
per Group) 
Number 
of Failed 
Agreements Efficiency 
Number of 
Groups 
Buyer Single period 25.9% NA 12 58.6% TV 
= 29 
Buyer 10-period costless delay 96.6% 10.8 0 100% TV 
= 29
Buyer 10-period costly delay 66.7% 2.9 0 85.3% TV 
= 30 
Seller Single period 15.4% NA 6 76.9% TV 
= 26 
Seller 10-period costless delay 91.7% 11.0  96.7% TV 
= 30 
Seller 10-period costly delay 71.7% 3.3 0 83.3% N 
= 30 
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Behavior versus Equilibrium Predictions 
Behavior is qualitatively, but not strictly, consistent with the game-theoretic predictions, 
which is consistent with general findings from the many ultimatum bargaining experiments that 
have been conducted to date. That is, using an equal split of the surplus as a natural focal point 
(offers/demands of 40), first-period offers and earnings favored the buyer in all of the buyer 
offer treatments but favored the sellers in all of the seller-demand treatments. These differences 
are statistically significant (in the hypothesized direction) in every case.7 
First-Round Offers and Demands across Treatments 
An important result of this study concerns the impacts that multi-period bargaining and 
costly delay have on initial offers or demands, as this likely determines, in part, the decisions of 
responders as well as the path of subsequent offers or demands. On average, first-period offers 
from the buyer-offer with costless delay treatment were $2.34 lower than in the single-period 
buyer-offer treatment, and the difference is statistically significant.8 Similarly, first-period 
demands were, on average, $5.09 higher than in the single-period seller-demand treatment.9 
Additionally, imposing costly delay caused average initial offers to rise by $1.54 and initial 
demands to fall by $2.56, relative to the costless delay treatments, and the differences are 
statistically significant.10 
Responders' First-Period Decisions 
Similarly, it is important to understand how the number of bargaining periods and the cost 
of delay impact a responder's bargaining stance as well. Table 2 shows that, as expected, the 
size of the actual offer or demand is an important determinant of the probability of accepting 
an offer. The probability of a seller accepting a buyer's first-round offer increased by around 
5.5% for each $1.00 increase in the offer, while the probability of a buyer accepting a seller's 
demand decreased by 6.3% for each $1.00 increase in the demand. However, buyers and sellers 
alike were much more likely to accept a given offer or demand if there was only a single 
bargaining period?buyers were 58% more likely and sellers were 37% more likely to accept in 
this case. However, both parties took a tougher bargaining stance when delay was costless. 
Buyers were 24% less likely to accept a given demand, and sellers were 38% less likely to accept 
a given offer under costless delay. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the cumulative probability (resulting from the probit model) of a 
responder accepting a given first-period offer or demand over the entire range of offers and 
demands. 
The figures further support the result that responders took a much tougher bargaining 
stance when delay was costless versus costly, but were much more willing to accept a given offer 
or demand in the single-period treatments relative to the multi-period treatments. 
7 
Using Wilcoxon signed ranks test, all one-tailed significance levels <0.015. 
8 
Using Mann-Whitney test, two-tailed significance level 
= 0.000. All statistical comparisons across treatments use 
Mann-Whitney tests. All within-treatment comparisons follow a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. 9 
Two-tailed significance level 
= 0.000. 
10 Two-tailed significance levels 
= 0.002 and 0.030, respectively. 
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Buyer-Offer Treatments 
1.2 
*?>. 4 ? 
'" 
$ * * $ $ <S> * <? 
Offer 
Figure 1. Probability of Sellers Accepting a Given Offer 
Final Earnings within Treatments 
In the single-period treatments, buyers' final earnings exceeded sellers' final earnings in the 
buyer-offer treatment,11 but although sellers earned more, on average, in the seller-demand 
treatment, the difference was not statistically significant. Interestingly, however, real final 
payoffs favored the buyer in all four of the multi-round treatments. This difference was 
statistically significant only in the buyer-offer with costly delay treatment.12 
Final Earnings versus First-Round Earnings within Treatments 
In all four multi-period treatments, the mean real earnings of the responder are higher 
than the mean first-period offer or demands would have generated, and the differences are 
statistically significant in every treatment.13 In other words, mean real offers to the responders 
rose in subsequent periods. This implies that, with or without delay costs, holdout (that is, 
rejecting low offers or high demands) is, on average, a payoff-improving strategy for the 
responder in each treatment. 
This result is particularly strong in the seller-demand treatments. Average first-period 
earnings for the buyer would have been very low in both treatments, and even negative in the 
seller-demand with costless delay treatment. Sellers face a difficult coordination problem in 
these treatments, and in this case made excessively high demands. In fact, over half of the 
buyers (18 out of 30) in this treatment effectively had negative offers in the first period as a 
result of the sellers' joint demands averaging $46.73 and had no choice but to reject at least one 
of the demands. The coordination problem was present, though not as severe, in the seller 
11 One-tailed significance level 
= 0.007. 
12 Two-tailed significance level 
= 0.004. 
13 
Using Wilcoxon signed ranks test, all two-tailed significance levels <0.022. 
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Figure 2. Probability of Buyers Accepting a Given Demand 
demand with costly delay treatment, where about a third of buyers (9 out of 30) faced negative 
payoffs in the first period. 
This result is further illustrated in Figures 3a through 4b, which give the change in real 
offers by buyers to sellers (Figures 3a, b)14 or by sellers to buyers (Figures 4a, b)15 following a 
rejection. 
Notice the tendency in Figures 3a and 3b for buyers' real offers to sellers to rise following 
a rejection, particularly in the early rounds. The result is even stronger for the seller-demand 
treatments. The change in sellers' joint demands following a rejection by the buyer resulted in a 
larger real surplus for the buyer in all but a few instances, even in the presence of costly delay. 
Holdout and Efficiency across Treatments 
As first-period offers decreased and first-period demands increased in the multi-period 
treatments relative to single-period treatments (and responders were more likely to reject a 
given offer or demand), the number of rejections increased dramatically, as illustrated in 
Table 3. Holdout was prevalent in all four multi-period treatments. Overall holdout was 
considerably higher in treatments without delay costs, with three to four times the number of 
rejected offers or demands per group compared to the treatments with delay costs. These 
differences were statistically significant.16 There was no significant difference in holdout 
between the buyer-offer treatments compared to the seller-demand treatments. Nearly all 
exchanges eventually occurred in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall 
efficiency relative to the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs. Only one 
group in one treatment (seller-demand with costless delay) failed to reach an agreement during 
the 10-period limit. 
14 Shown is the real surplus offered by buyers to sellers. 15 Shown is the real buyer's surplus that resulted from the joint demands made by sellers. 
16 
Using Mann-Whitney test, two-tailed significance level 
= 0.000 in each case. 
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(b) Buyer offer, costly delay treatment 
Figure 3. Change in Real Offers (to Sellers) by Period 
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Figure 4. Change in Real Offers (to Buyers) by Period 
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5. Conclusion 
The theory of holdout developed in the land-assembly literature is difficult to empirically 
evaluate due to the lack of reliable field data on buyer and seller valuations and delay costs. 
Our research provides an initial systematic empirical study of holdout behavior in multilateral 
bargaining environments by linking the theoretical analysis with the well-developed 
experimental literature on bargaining. In contrast to the existing experimental bargaining 
literature, our design utilizes multi-person groups with co-dependent transactions and delay 
costs that introduce a holdout possibility as well as a holdout externality. 
In particular, we examine the behavioral responses of proposers and responders to changes 
in bargaining institutions, the number of bargaining periods, and the costs associated with delay. 
The results of a series of six treatments demonstrate that holdout is common across bargaining 
institutions and is a payoff-improving strategy on average, despite the presence of delay costs, in 
each of the treatments studied to date. As such, our results indicate that even if the holdout 
problem does not exist in theory (assuming payoff-maximizing bargainers), it may still exist in 
practice. The number of bargaining periods also had a significant effect on subject behavior. 
Initial offers-to-buy decrease and demands-to-sell increase in multi-period bargaining treatments 
relative to a single-period treatment. Compounding this problem is that responders exhibited a 
lower probability of accepting a given offer or demand in the early periods of the multi-period 
treatments. Thus, opportunities for additional bargaining may have led both proposers and 
responders to take a more aggressive bargaining stance initially, with the recognition that offers 
or demands could become more generous in subsequent periods, if necessary. Imposing delay 
costs causes offers-to-buy to rise, demands-to-sell to fall, a higher probability of responders 
accepting a given offer or demand, and less overall holdout. Importantly, nearly all exchanges 
eventually occurred in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to 
the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs. 
It would clearly be premature, however, to discount the potential welfare improvements 
that eminent domain might provide based on these findings alone. Substantial land-assembly 
type projects in the field likely involve many more parties than in our experiment, as well as 
significant information asymmetries, both of which are likely to increase bargaining delay and 
associated delay costs. The potential for eminent domain to improve social welfare in the field, 
however, depends on whether it actually reduces delay costs relative to voluntary transfer, a 
question that has yet to be adequately addressed theoretically, empirically, or experimentally. 
While their modeling framework is different from ours, Miceli and Segerson (2007) show 
theoretically how the threat of eminent domain can result in earlier agreements. Munch (1975), 
however, demonstrates empirically that the threat of eminent domain may depress property 
values, resulting in intentional delay on the part of the buyer and potentially high court costs 
associated with the eminent domain process. It would be interesting to examine how the 
background threat of eminent domain affects behavior in an experimental setting such as ours. 
Therefore, the current study should be viewed as an initial empirical investigation of 
holdout behavior and costs, leaving many important questions unanswered. We recognize that 
potentially important features of real-world bargaining environments are absent, and we 
propose to broaden the investigation to include environments with larger bargaining groups, 
competition between sellers, incomplete information about buyers' values and sellers' costs, and 
eminent domain threats. Furthermore, exploring the use of alternative bargaining institutions, 
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such as alternating offers or Nash bargaining, should be a fruitful avenue for future 
experimental research into behavior in multilateral bargaining situations. 
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